"The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churcill ..."

[Swampy]

The late William Manchester has written biographies of Douglas Macarthur and H. L. Mencken, and he also completed two volumes of his masterpiece on the life of Winston Churchill, ending in 1940. But he suffered two strokes, which meant he could not finis the final volume, and he gave the task to Paul Reid, a Palm Beach, FL reporter.

I haven't read Reid's book, but it's about 1,000 pages. That said, I wonder if he can adopt the style of another person. Perhaps, as this NYT reviewer said, Manchester should have left it at two volumes, ending in 1940, with Churchill about to see his finest hour. But I've read the earlier volumes, and they cannot stand alone - the tone left me hanging and wanting to finish the story. So maybe I'll get the final volume after all.

[boxcar]

Pre 1940, Churchill had some failures (Gallipoli) and some successes (he first conceived the tank warfare). After 1940, IMO, his successes were as a diplomat and having the ability to pick the right man for the job (Stephenson the man called Intripid).

[Sir John]

The concept of the Gallipoli invasion was sound.

It was the execution of it, and the Turks fanatical defence of their homeland that caused the failure.


SJ

[boxcar]

Naval campaign(Wikipedia)

Main article: Naval operations in the Dardanelles Campaign

[edit] Attempt to force the Straits





Mehmed Esad Pasha (Bülkat) and Ottoman battery at Gallipoli
On 19 February, the first attack on the Dardanelles began when a strong Anglo-French task force, including the British battleship HMS Queen Elizabeth, bombarded Ottoman artillery along the coast. Many believed victory to be inevitable. Admiral Carden sent a cable to Churchill on 4 March, stating that the fleet could expect to arrive in Istanbul within 14 days.[20] A sense of impending victory was heightened by the interception of a German wireless message which revealed the Ottoman Dardanelle forts were close to running out of ammunition.[20] When the message was relayed to Carden, it was agreed a main attack would be launched on or around 17 March.(some 30 days hence) It transpired that Carden, suffering from stress, was placed on the sick list by the medical officer, meaning the fleet was now placed in command of Admiral de Robeck.

On 18 March the main attack was launched. The fleet, comprising 18 battleships with a supporting array of cruisers and destroyers, sought to target the narrowest point of the Dardanelles, where the straits are just a mile wide. Despite some damage sustained by ships engaging the Ottoman forts, minesweepers were ordered to proceed along the straits. According to an account by the Ottoman General Staff, by 2 pm "All telephone wires were cut, all communications with the forts were interrupted, some of the guns had been knocked out ... in consequence the artillery fire of the defence had slackened considerably".[21] The French battleship Bouvet was sunk by a mine, causing it to capsize with its entire crew aboard. Minesweepers, manned by civilians and under constant fire of Ottoman shells, retreated, leaving the minefields largely intact. HMS Irresistible and HMS Inflexible both sustained critical damage from mines, although there was confusion during the battle about the cause of the damage—some blamed torpedoes. HMS Ocean, sent to rescue the Irresistible, was itself struck by an explosion and both ships eventually sank.[22] The French battleships Suffren and Gaulois were also damaged. All the ships had sailed through a new line of mines placed secretly by the Ottoman minelayer Nusret 10 days before.(remember the 30 day delay. Had the Allies used more haste, there would have been less waste)

The losses prompted the Allies to cease any further attempts to force the straits by naval power alone. Losses had been anticipated during the planning of the campaign, so mainly obsolete battleships had been sent which were unfit to face the German fleet. However, many naval officers—including de Robeck and Fisher—did not consider the losses acceptable. The defeat of the British fleet had also given the Ottomans a morale boost, although their gunners had almost run out of ammunition before the British fleet retreated. The reasons for the decision to turn back are unclear.

(Now was the problem poor execution? I’ll have to agree with you that without that 30 day delay, the outcome could have been much different.)