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Post by Deleted on Feb 21, 2013 18:16:13 GMT -5
The Germans became confused and thouht they were heading to Germany when they were actually heading for Scapa Flow
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Post by Sir John on Feb 21, 2013 18:23:09 GMT -5
You mean German sailors do not know right from left?
mcnoch will be right over to deal with you!
SJ
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Post by Deleted on Feb 21, 2013 19:10:53 GMT -5
Germans should stick to what they're good at , making war is not one .
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Post by Sir John on Feb 21, 2013 20:10:22 GMT -5
OUCH!
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Post by mcnoch on Feb 22, 2013 16:05:05 GMT -5
While I’m not sure about which sea-battle muleskinner07 is speaking, most likely not the one of Jutland 1916 , I think boxcar’s question can be answered only with a look onto the strategic situation, the plans and targets. The Germans set up this battle as test and proof of concept for Von Tirpitz’s “Risk Theory” that was designed to help the Germans to change the strategic situation in the North Sea to the better for Germany. So for the Germans the battle was not over, they had to take the risk to make a second run to prove the point. What the governance and media later made out of this battle is just way out of proportion of the real military meaning. Not sure who won this engagement, but the real loser was the German surface fleet as such as it was clear that the submarine was the key maritime weapon for the Germans, not the battle fleet, as would be confirmed during WWII again.
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Post by Deleted on Feb 22, 2013 18:13:33 GMT -5
The problem is in the fact the Germans had a plan , this was / and is always risky thing for them .
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Post by boxcar on Feb 22, 2013 20:37:22 GMT -5
From Wikipedia:
The High Seas Fleet was commanded by Vice-Admiral Reinhard Scheer, and the Grand Fleet by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe. The German fleet's intention was to lure out, trap, and destroy a portion of the Grand Fleet, as the German naval force was insufficient to successfully engage the entire British fleet. This formed part of a larger strategy to break the British blockade of Germany and to allow German mercantile shipping to operate. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy pursued a strategy to engage and destroy the High Seas Fleet, or keep the German force contained and away from Britain's own shipping lanes. The German plan was to use Vice-Admiral Franz Hipper's fast scouting group of five modern battlecruisers to lure Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty's battlecruiser squadrons into the path of the main German fleet. Submarines were stationed in advance across the likely routes for British ships. However, the British learned from signal intercepts that a major fleet operation was likely, so on 30 May Jellicoe sailed with the Grand Fleet to rendezvous with Beatty, passing over the locations of the German submarine picket lines while they were unprepared. The German plan had been delayed, causing further problems for their submarines which had reached the limit of their endurance at sea. On the afternoon of 31 May, Beatty encountered Hipper's battlecruiser force long before the Germans had expected. In a running battle, Hipper successfully drew the British vanguard into the path of the High Seas Fleet. By the time Beatty sighted the larger force and turned back towards the British main fleet, he had lost two battlecruisers from a force of six battlecruisers and four battleships, against the five ships commanded by Hipper. The battleships, commanded by Rear-Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas, were the last to turn and formed a rearguard as Beatty withdrew, now drawing the German fleet in pursuit towards the main British positions. Between 18:30, when the sun was lowering on the western horizon, backlighting the German forces, and nightfall at about 20:30, the two fleets – totalling 250 ships between them – directly engaged twice. Fourteen British and eleven German ships were sunk, with great loss of life. After sunset, and throughout the night, Jellicoe maneuvered to cut the Germans off from their base, in hopes of continuing the battle next morning, but under the cover of darkness Scheer broke through the British light forces forming the rearguard of the Grand Fleet and returned to port.[3] Both sides claimed victory. The British lost more ships and twice as many sailors, and the British press criticised the Grand Fleet's failure to force a decisive outcome, but Scheer's plan of destroying a substantial portion of the British fleet also failed. The Germans' 'fleet in being' continued to pose a threat, requiring the British to keep their battleships concentrated in the North Sea, but the battle confirmed the German policy of avoiding all fleet-to-fleet contact. At the end of the year, after further unsuccessful attempts to reduce the Royal Navy's numerical advantage, the German Navy turned its efforts and resources to unrestricted submarine warfare and the destruction of Allied and neutral shipping which by April 1917 triggered America's declaration of war on Germany.[4] Subsequent reviews commissioned by the Royal Navy generated strong disagreement between supporters of Jellicoe and Beatty concerning the two admirals' performance in the battle. Debate over their performance and the significance of the battle continues today.
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Post by boxcar on Feb 22, 2013 21:26:02 GMT -5
Here is a slightly different account of the battle of Jutland. Rather than Scheer having escaped the battle the first time and then turning back into it for the second time, this account attributes the maneuvering to Jellicoe.
Ideally, the battle line would cross the intended path of the enemy column so that the maximum number of guns could be brought to bear, while the enemy could fire only with the forward guns of the leading ships, a maneuver known as "crossing the T". Admiral Tôgô, commander of the Japanese battleship fleet, had achieved this against Admiral Rozhestvensky's Russian battleships in 1905 at the Battle of Tsushima, with devastating results. Jellicoe was to achieve this twice in one hour against the High Seas Fleet at Jutland, but on both occasions Scheer managed to turn away and disengage, thereby avoiding a decisive action.
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